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DELINQUENT GIRLS IN COURT. By Paul W. Tappan. Columbia Univ.
Press, New York, (1947) pp. x; 265. $3.00.
Specialized experimental courts are not new in New York City. The
first night courts for both men and women were established in 1907. These
courts; it is said, competed with theatres for entertainment seekers. As
a result, there was established in 1916 a separate night court for women
in Manhattan, and one in the Bronx, "to limit the number of doubtful
male characters, who were seen from time to time among the spectators
at the night courts." In 1918 the Women's Night Court of Manhattan
became a day court with provision by statute for the remand of female
prisoners for observation and study after conviction and before sentence.
In 1934 it became city-wide in jurisdiction. Two years later the Wayward
Minor Court was inaugurated as a special part of the Women's Court by
the authority of power vested in the Board of Magistrates to establish
specialized courts for the handling of specified offenses. And in March
1944 the Wayward Minor Court was established as an entirely separate
specialized court.
Delinquent Girls in Court is a study of the Wayward Minor Court
of New York. The very name of the court (fortunately changed in 1945
to "Girls Term") signifies it is a court for the administration of socialized
justice. A person who is to make a study of it should have both an
understanding of judicial processes by which the court functions and the
social knowledge and skills which such a court should employ. Dr. Paul
W. Tappan would seem to have both qualifications. He is a member of
the New York Bar and a trained sociologist, holding advanced degrees
in both fields. And he has done a thorough job. The book shows the
fruits of scholarship and penetrating social analyses. And when the
author has finished he leaves no doubt of his dissatisfaction with the court.
The final chapters contain suggestions for changes and administrative
reorganization.
New York, as well as other metropolitan cities, has a juvenile delinquency problem. It has the problem of the adolescent girl who is not
conforming to accepted mores, who is in "danger of becoming morally
depraved." Because of the size of the city the problem is larger. The
Wayward Minor Court was, therefore, established and given jurisdiction
"of any person between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one who either
(1) is habitually addicted to the use of drugs or intemperate use of intoxicating liquors, or (2) habitually associates with dissolute persons, or
(3) is found of his or her own free will and knowledge in a house of
prostitution or assignation or ill fame, or (4) habitually associates with
thieves, prostitutes, pimps or procurers of disorderly persons, or (5) is
wilfully disobedient to the reasonable and lawful commands of parent,
guardian or other custodian and is morally depraved or is in danger of
becoming morally depraved may be deemed a wayward minor."
In practice only sub-section 5 of the statute is used in the complaints
largely because of the difficulties of securing sufficiently specific proof
under the other provisions of the Act. "The central issue under the rule
in operation, then, is the imminent or existent 'moral depravity' of the
defendant."
The Court has an intake department where all complainants are
interviewed by a probation officer. These complaints are ordinarily made
by the parent or guardian. The next step in the proceeding is the arraign(137)
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ment at which time the defendant is informed of the charge against her
and of her rights under the law. Adjournment is then customary to
permit investigation of the case history by the probation department.
During the period of adjournment the Court may make a temporary disposition by either (1) parole: the girl is returned to her parents, relatives,
or friends, or to an agency; (2) remand: the girl is sent to one or more
institutional shelters or to a hospital for custody, diagnosis, or the beginning
of treatment; (3) parole and remand: where it is found that both types of
interim disposition are required.
The hearing is the final step, and testimony is taken before the judge.
If he finds against the defendant she is adjudicated to the status of "wayward minor." The defendant may be subjected to either of two general
types of treatment-official probation or commitment to some institution
for an indeterminate period up to three years. If the girl is not adjudicated
a wayward minor, the Court may still retain what is known as "unofficial
supervision," either through an officer of the Court or a representative of
a social agency.
Two classes of cases would seem generally to fall under the Court's
jurisdiction: (1) The adolescents who are guilty or suspected of sexual
misbehavior. As to these cases Professor Tappan says: "In practical
effect the result may be to subject to punishment merely those individuals
among the sexually active who are so inept in their expression as to be
'trapped' by parent, police officer, or nature. In the latter case it frequently means that the pregnant unwed girl enters motherhood as a wayward minor and is fortunate if her child is not born in custody."
(2)
Adolescents who have been guilty of insubordination to parents. As to
this class Professor Tappan says: "When . . . the Court . . . wields
its authority to penalize or terminate filial insubordination, questions of
equal difficulty arise. In an era of increasing emancipation of youth, to
what standard of obedience should the daughter be held ?"
Since both classes of cases are based on moral depravity, "the problem of drawing lines delimiting the area" says Tappan, "is peculiarly acute
when moral, religious, national, and cultural biases may direct discretionary
interpretation. This makes for considerable conflict and confusion in the
Court."
The analysis and evaluation of the operation of the Court, its inadequacies in staff and commitment institutions, the lack of cooperation

with community agencies, should be welcome not only to the Court itself
but to the sociologist, lawyer, judge and citizen, who are faced with the

growing need of specialized courts for specific cases. The chapter dealing
with diversities that flow from the temperaments and characters of presiding judges, dramatize the age old problem of how justice can ever be
equally administered by "unequal" judges.
Our point of departure with Professor Tappan is in his basic criticism
of the functions of the Court. He believes that it should not function
except upon a charge of a specific offense. The force of the law should
not be brought into application except upon some recognized departure
from the law which is to be proven by competent evidence before any
steps are undertaken.
le is disturbed that due process is being denied
to the young. The remand and pre-trial investigation he disapproves as
wholly unconstitutional, condemning the girl before she is found "guilty."
In his recommendations he would have a legal representative to advise
the adolescent of her rights and to defend her. "A representative of the
Juvenile Aid Bureau, or from the Legal Aid Society, might well perform
this function."
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Unfortunately, the author has not quite rid himself of his schizophrenic professional personality. He writes frequently as a good sociologist
and frequently as a good traditional lawyer. But not too often as that
rare blend of socio-legalist.
The Court and its agencies carry the stigma of the criminal system.
And as a good traditional lawyer Professor Tappan is thinking of the
age-old protection built around a person accused of a crime. But the
proceedings are not criminal in nature in spite of the historical classification under which they fall. Juvenile Courts suffer from the same difficulty, and in time we may rid them entirely of the criminal stigma which
still attaches to them. The traditional lawyer now recognizes that courts
have universally held the procedure in the Juvenile Court as constitutional.
And the procedure in Wayward Minor Court is no different. There are
no star chamber proceedings. No one is being convicted of a crime. The
power which the Juvenile Court exercises over children and the wayward
minor, is part and parcel of a power exercised by chancellors and judges
since time immemorial. In 1828, Lord Redesdale, speaking in Wellesley
v. Wellesley, 2 Bligh (N. S.) 124, said the right of a chancellor to exercise
such power had not been questioned for 150 years.
If all that is expected of this Court is to punish, or even reform a
guilty person, then it loses its great value as a preventive agency in dealing
with the hundreds of cases of maladjusted youth who are on the road
towards delinquency and crime. A court properly staffed may uncover
a condition which might be a precipitant of crime and may remove it. We
cannot always leave the handling of these cases, involving family disputes
and filial insubordination, to the social agencies. Would that we could!
Frequently there must be compulsion and authority to compel the use of
these agencies which can be one of the most important techniques of the
Court. Miss Rappaport, writing in A Ccse Work Approach to Sex
Delinquents (Pennsylvania School of Social Work, 14), says: "Thus far
in our experience, contrary to common belief, we have found it infinitely
easier for the agency to help and for the girl to be helped if she comes to
us on probation, since the authority of the court is a powerful dynamica dynamic carrying within it the supportive right to help another through
the uncertain steps which lead to change. We are struggling to find
something as powerful as that for helping a girl who comes to us voluntarily."
Professor Tappan recognizes that youth is the period when, if at all,
effective work of reformation and rehabilitation may still be carried on
so that the continued, aggravated criminal careers of adulthood may be
prevented. He recognizes that a specialized tribunal for the adolescent
girl, with an attempt to coordinate available facilities, has constituted,
ideologically, a long step towards more effective treatment of the young.
It is a mistake, therefore, to restrict the Court to old criminal concepts
and forms and to worry about the due process and constitutional rights
of our children, when that point has long been decided by the courts.
Our efforts and emphasis should be in the direction indicated by Roscoe
Pound in The Future of Socialized Justice: "We must go on to direct our
energies not only to setting up tribunals and agencies of individualization
where they are still lacking, but even more to development and provision
of techniques, of personnel, of training, and of adequate facilities."
Nochem S. Winnet.t
t Judge, Municipal Court of Philadelphia.
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ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS.
By Ernest G.
Fifth Edition. West Publishing Co., 1946, pp. xlviii, 984.

CASES AND MATERIALS

Lorenzen.

LAWS. By Ernest G. Lorenzen.
Published for the Yale Law School Association by The Yale University Press, 1947. Pp. 542.

SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT OF

Professor Lorenzen's Selected Articles, treading close on the heels of
a fifth edition of his casebook, call for a full-dress evaluation of the work

of their distinguished author in the conflict of laws. Competent hands,
it is hoped, will attempt such a critique. The present review can only
skim the surface.
It is hardly open to question that the leading American Conflicts
scholars of the last generation were the late Professors Beale and Cook
and (if it is proper to include among the last generation one so hale and
active) Professor Lorenzen. Each member of this doughty trio has
made a distinctive contribution to American Conflicts learning. Beale, in
the great Cambridge tradition, forged from the rough ore of the AngloAmerican cases a heavy bludgeon of doctrine. He was not ignorant of
alien materials,' but they were not part of the common law; nor were any
cases part of the common law if they were not amenable to the territorial
axioms derived by Story from Huber. The law of a state binds all persons
and property within the state, and none without it. "If the law of the
place where the parties act refuses legal validity to their acts, it is impossible to see on what principle some other law may nevertheless give their
acts validity." 2 Thus Beale on the validity of contracts. The many cases
referring validity to the place of performance rather than to the place of
making, and the Continental doctrine, also imbedded in the cases, which
gives effect to the intention of the parties,-these misinterpreted the common law as revealed at Harvard. Beale's monuments were the Restateinent and the Treatise, more lasting than brass perhaps but more easily
tarnished. For the Restatement wants restating, and profane hands have
been laid on the Treatise, even to sully the pertinence of the citations.3
Cook brought to Conflicts a mind scientifically trained which delighted in paradox and in subtle analysis. In his articles, also collected
in book form with the benefit of afterthoughts and counter-attacks by the
author,4 he elaborated the local law theory for which Judge Learned Hand
provided a decisional foundation. A court, Cook insisted, cannot and
does not "apply foreign law" or "enforce foreign-created rights." It enforces its own law, which, in cases with foreign elements, will often direct
a decision as near as may be to the result which the appropriate foreign
court would reach in a like case. This may be only a verbal formula;
but to many, as an explanation of what the courts do, it is more appealing
than Beale's rigidities.
No such gulf separates Cook from Lorenzen.5 The latter's contributions to general theory have been more modestly stated than Cook's, but
1. BEALE, BARTOLUS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1914).

2. Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of Contract I1? 23 HARv. L. Rxv. 260
(1910).
3. See Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong: A Study in the Method of Case-law, 19
TJL. L. REv. 165 (1944).
4. CooK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942).
5. Indeed, their names are often linked. See 3 BEALE, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS (1935) 1879: "In this country a new doctrine, that of the self-styled realists,
has been put forward. It may be studied in current articles of W. W. Cook, Lorenzen,
and Cavers. It is a very interesting doctrine, but one with which lawyers in practice
have little concern; for it is admitted that the courts do not consciously accede to it."
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are no less important. The Selected Articles open appropriately with the
well-known "Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws," published in 1924 6 within a few months of Cook's initial contribution. 7 Denouncing the erection of a Conflicts system on any a priori basis, especially
on the territorial maxims of Story (for Story read Beale), the essay
recognizes that "each sovereign state can determine the rules of the Conflict of Laws in accordance with its own notions of what is just and
proper." Furthermore, Anglo-American courts pick and choose among
available choices as they think justice demands. "Their aim has been to
reach a just decision under the circumstances of the particular case and
they have reached their conclusions as far as possible by a consideration
of the social interests involved." If a situation involves no policy considerations which different states regard as requiring differing results, then
certainty and uniformity can triumph.
It may be objected that such doctrine, even more than the unruly
horse, public policy, which it sought to harness, leads to complete provincialism, and abandonment of that international uniformity which is the
admitted goal of Conflicts systems. 8 Indeed, it is said by no less an
authority than Professor Yntema, that even today American Conflicts
doctrine suffers from '!isolationism." 9
If this embarrassing charge is well-founded, it is through no fault of
Professor Lorenzen. His substantial contribution to theory was an injection of realism. Even more substantial was his addition to our scanty
sum of knowledge of how the other half lives. He commenced in 1909
with the first edition of his casebook to enrich the stream of cases with
the distilled experience of the Continent and of Latin America. To these
concise introductions and annotations the latest edition, in view of "the
position of Russia and China in the new world order, as well as our
interest in Japan," adds references to their Conflicts rules as well.
In the press of the classroom this comparative material is doubtless
neglected. Consequently one at first regrets to note that the Selected
Articles omit any of Professor Lorenzen's surveys of foreign law, and are
confined "strictly to a discussion of Anglo-American problems." But
whether the problem is contracts, torts, or the statute of frauds, to mention only a few of the dozen essays in specific fields of domestic interest,
the opinions of European scholars and the less weighty opinions of
European courts are clearly, critically, and calmly compared with the
cases, sometimes to the disadvantage of the latter.' 0
Some of this work was truly pioneering. The early articles on the
renvoi (1910) and qualifications (1920) were the first in this country.
The average law student and perhaps Professor Lorenzen himself may
wish he had never opened Pandora's box. His latest consideration of
the "Qualification, Classification, or Characterization Problem" (which
includes the renvoi) makes only cautious concessions to those who in cer6. 33 YALE L. J. 736 (1924).
7. Ibid. at 457.
8. Another serious question, which cannot be answered here, is this: Have not
the realists failed to discover and analyze just what the pertinent policy considerations
are in Conflicts cases? Cook made a plea in avoidance that first the rank weeds had
to be rooted out of the field. Attempts which have been made by others to weigh
economic and social factors in various Conflicts problems would, it is feared, seem inadequate to an economist or a sociologist.
9. Foreword to RABEL, THE ConFLIct oF LAws (1945) xvi.
10. It is only in the essays on Williams v. North Carolina, I and II, and like out-

growths of the peculiar jurisprudence of our federal system that the foreign analogies
become relatively muted.
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tain cases would utilize the Conflicts rules of a foreign state as well as its
internal law. If it is true, as Rabel gloomily states, that the intransigence
which Professor Lorenzen shares with certain European scholars about
these esoteric matters has produced "black pessimism" in the Conflicts
world," it is no less true that his attitude is largely a product of a sense
of the practical often lacking in that world. The fine-spun references
demanded by the renvoi are often to situations which the foreign courts
have never considered, and Professor Lorenzen mistrusts the conjectures
2
of foreign law "experts" in this field as a basis for domestic decision.1
The foregoing conveys no adequate impression of the wide scope of
the essays, ranging from commercial arbitration to polygamy. The Yale
Law School Association is to be commended for making their collection
possible; his own writings do far more honor to the author than the usual
hodge-podge of a festschrift. In this connection it seems regrettable that
a complete bibliography of Professor Lorenzen's work was not included;
and one must also note that the index is exceedingly sketchy.
Turning to the latest edition of the Cases and Materials, little needs
be added to an assertion that it remains an effective teaching tool. It is
also, as has been suggested, a useful guide to foreign rules. One apparently insoluble problem in the organization of Conflicts casebooks is the
disposition of such matters as domicil, or characterization, or substance
and procedure, within a framework of categories like tort, contract, property, etc. The fourth edition tucked them away in what seemed convenient corners. In the new edition they are brought out in the open in
a chapter of many sections, into which the teacher can dive for whatever
pearls he wishes to cast. A related attempt to collect in one chapter cases
which illustrate the influence of the Federal Constitution seems to the
reviewer less useful. Whether the comparative scholars like it or not,
constitutional guarantees and prohibitions permeate American Conflicts;
they can hardly be strained out, and indeed Professor Lorenzen has not
really attempted it. The great cases from the Supreme Court are scattered
through the book. Many of them, it should be said, have been cruelly
cut in an otherwise cormnendable effort to reduce the volume of material.
On further thought, it may be that the evaluation called for in the
first paragraph is premature. Professor Lorenzen nominally retired in
1943 after forty years of teaching. A year ago he re-entered the classroom
with a full-time appointment at the University of Miami. Both his energy
and his output seem undiminished. Unless he is beguiled by the land of
the lotus-eaters, we may, while wishing him many years, expect from him
many essays.
Ralph S. Brown.-

SPENDTHRIFr TRUSTS.

By Erwin N. Griswold. Second Edition. Matthew,

Bender & Company, New York, 1947. Pp. xxxvi, 767.
It would require a degree of assurance for a lawyer to predict what
the law of spendthrift trusts will be in another generation. But to one
11. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1945) 55.
12. As an illustration, one cannot help admiring the sangfroid with which the
Privy Council, in Jaber Elias Kotia v. Katr Bint Jiryes Nahas [19411 A. C. 403,
decided on an appeal from Palestine, how a Lebanese court would dispose of the Palestinian immovables of a Lebanese national.
t Assistant Professor of Law, Yale School of Law.
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who would have a true comprehension of what the law is today, its origin,
the changes it has undergone, and the further modifications that may be
ahead, this is a necessary and interesting book.
In colonial America the philosophical background of the economy
was the doctrine of natural rights, chief exponent of which was John
Locke. In June, 1776, the new Virginia Constitution, which may be
considered characteristic of the thinking of the day and which included a
Bill of Rights, provided: "1. That all men are by nature equally free and
independent, have certain inherent rights, of which when they enter into
a state of society, they cannot by any compact deprive or divert their
posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of
acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness
and safety." (Emphasis supplied.) This was the then generally accepted
principle. The phrase in most common use was "life, liberty and property." When Thomas Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence,
natural rights were the central theme, the very core of the statement. In
the first drafts, these included "life, liberty and property," but in the final
draft, doubtless to avoid controversy, the words used were "life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness." (Cf. BATES, AMERICAN FAITH (1940)
273; CURTI, GROWTH OF AMERICAN THOUGHT (1943) 117.)
The spendthrift trust has its origin in this doctrine of natural rights
and may be said to represent the quintessence of the right of private property. It had no counterpart in earlier English law. To quote from an
early case: "Whoever has the right to give has the right to dispose of the
same as he pleases. Cujus est dare ejus est disponere is the maxim which
governs in such case." Ashhurst v. Given, 5 W. & S. 323 (Pa. 1843).
Later we find the following: "It is always to be remembered that consideration for the beneficiary does not even in the remotest way enter into the
policy of the law; it has regard solely to the rights of the donor. Spendthrift trusts can have no other justification than is to be found in considerations affecting the donor alone." Morgan's Estate, 223 Pa. 228 (1909).
It is fair to say, however, as Professor Griswold points out, that
these principles, so blandly stated as established, were, when first announced, of a rather dubious incontrovertibility. It might be said in paraphrase that the body of spendthrift-trust law, in some jurisdictions, notably
Pennsylvania, has been laid, as a result of numerous decisions, in foundations of concrete and steel when the contractors began work with nothing
more substantial than planks, hammer, and nails.
The spendthrift trust owes its validity: First, to the procedural difficulties encountered by a creditor in attempting through a proceeding at
law to reach the interest of the beneficiary of a trust which was cognizable
only in equity. In these cases, most of them in Pennsylvania, the dismissals of the creditors' suits on purely procedural grounds were misinterpreted as judicial precedents of substantive law. Second, in a case
in the United States Supreme Court, Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 716
(1875), Mr. Justice Miller, by way of dictum, gave express recognition
to the validity of spendthrift trusts. Third, the text writer, Perry,
through revisions in succeeding editions of his treatise on Trusts, the first
in 1872, the second in 1874, and the third in 1882, left little doubt on the
subject. The law as finally revised was stated thus: "There is eminent
authority in the Federal and State courts for the proposition, that the
power of alienation is not a necessary incident to an equitable estate for
life, and that the owner of property may, in the free exercise of his bounty,
so dispose of it as to secure its enjoyment to the objects of his bounty
without making it alienable by them or liable for their debts, and that
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this intention, clearly expressed by the founder of a trust, must be carried
I
out by the courts."
Professor Griswold's book is a valuable contribution to the law.
After tracing the origin of the spendthrift trust and an extensive review
of the authorities and statutes in the different jurisdictions, he discusses
the basis for it, the modifications and limitations, statutory and otherwise,
on the original doctrine, and the social justification for its continued
recognition. We need not pause to consider the cases in the different
jurisdictions, all of which are dealt with adequately in the text, except to
mention one of a few cases in which the doctrine was stretched to its
furthest limit. In Kilroy v. Wood, 42 Hun 636 (N. Y. 1886), the beneficiary was allowed an exemption from the claims of his creditors because
of his "high social standing," because his associations are chiefly with "men
of leisure," and because "he is connected with a number of clubs." This
decision was characterized by Professor Gray in his book on Restraints
on Alienation as a case which "descended to a depth of as shameless snobbishness as any into which the justice of a country was ever plunged."
The reader then has the benefit of Professor Griswold's own opinion, all
too rare in the ordinary text book, including the recommendation of a
model statute which he has drafted. There will be no extension of the
doctrine of spendthrift trusts. Professor Griswold makes that clear. The
question is how far the courts will go in continuing to follow established
precedents and what the legislatures will have to say on the subject. In
all this, Pennsylvania is "a state of paramount importance in the field of
spendthrift trusts" in the language of Professor Griswold. He traces
the steady restriction in the scope of the law and the limits within which
it is now allowed to operate. With this tendency he expresses sympathy
and agreement.
Professor Griswold seems to feel that to advocate any questioning of
unrestricted spendthrift trusts is a view that might be regarded as advanced if not heretical and requires justification. He argues that the
right of disposition is already circumscribed by dower and curtesy, limitations on charitable gifts, and the rule against perpetuities. The proposition
needs no demonstration. The law alreadv has in effect other and heavier
restrictions on the doctrine Cujus est dare ejus est disponere. In the
opinion of the reviewer, the limitations above given are less important than
two principles of law even more solidly established: First, the disposition
of property by will is wholly a creature of statute. Not even the most
extreme extension of the doctrine Cujus est dare ejus est disponere has
included any suggestion denying the right of the legislature to impose
restrictions on the transfer of property by will even to the point of prohibiting it entirely. Second, there can be no doubt that the doctrine
Cujus est dare is not only limited, but in some cases practically abolished
by the levying and exaction of estate and inheritance, taxes. For anyone
at this date to question the validity of taxation of estates and inheritances,
riot to mention gifts, would be to attempt to howl down the wind in the
wilderness. Professor Griswold need feel no dismay in advocating limitations on spendthrift trusts, which he considers socially desirable. When the
President of Harvard University questions the whole doctrine of trusts,
there is nothing very sensational in proposing that spendthrift trusts be

curtailed. In Wanted: American Radicals, 171

ATLANTIC MONT]LY
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(1943), President Conant in describing such a person says: "To prevent
the growth of a caste system, which he abhors, he will be resolute in his
demand to confiscate (by constitutional methods) all property over a generation. He will demand really effective inheritance and gift taxes and

19471

BOOK REVIEWS

the breaking up of trust funds and estates. And this point cannot be
lightly pushed aside, for it is the kernel of his radical philosophy."
Professor Griswold's model statute provides that the limit on the
spendthrift trust be a maximum of $5000 income per annum, that creditors
of the beneficiary may reach ten per cent of the income where it exceeds
$12 a week, and that the court should have power to direct the payment
of income in suitable amount where the claim of the creditor is for the
support of a husband, wife, or child of the beneficiary, or for alimony;
for necessary services rendered or necessary supplies furnished to the
beneficiary; a tort or judgment for any such claim. These would appear
to be entirely reasonable provisions from which no one will dissent. From
the recognition of validity to an almost unlimited degree, the courts and
legislatures in most states have gradually reduced the scope of the spendthrift trust until it is more in keeping with current thought aind social
usage and follows in large measure the lines of this recommendation. (See
Pennsylvania Estates Act of 1947, § 12.)
There would seem to be no doubt that it is entirely proper and socially
justifiable that the income of inexperienced, gullible, and defenseless beneficiaries should be protected from the claims of creditors by spendthrift
trust clauses; not so much, however, because of the right of the original
owner of the property to fetter it with whatever restrictions he chooses
but because the beneficiary requires protection. But there is responsible
opinion, on the other hand, that it is not socially desirable to continue to
sanction the complete immunity of assets from the creditors of one who is
physically able and should be morally responsible for his commitments
and undertakings. There is also diversity of opinion on how far such
immunity, if permitted, should extend.
It is fortunate that this book should be made available to members
of the Pennsylvania Bar, for, as Professor Griswold points out repeatedly,
in no jurisdiction has the validity of the spendthrift trust been so firmly
established nor its sanction so widely extended as in Pennsylvania. This
is a scholarly work that will interest the reader and to which the legislatures of many states will doubtless turn with eager attention. It will be
of continuing value and interest in the law of trusts.
C. Allison Scully.t
t Member, Philadelphia Bar.
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